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Strategy-proof judgment aggregation
Franz Dietrich and Christian List1
Which rules for aggregating judgments on logically connected propositions are manipulable
and which not? In this paper, we introduce a preference-free concept of non-manipulability
and contrast it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness. We characterize all
non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules and prove an impossibility
theorem similar to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. We also discuss weaker forms of non-
manipulability and strategy-proofness. Comparing two frequently discussed aggregation rules,
we show that ￿conclusion-based voting￿ is less vulnerable to manipulation than ￿premise-
based voting￿ , which is strategy-proof only for ￿reason-oriented￿individuals. Surprisingly, for
￿outcome-oriented￿individuals, the two rules are strategically equivalent, generating identical
judgments in equilibrium. Our results introduce game-theoretic considerations into judgment
aggregation and have implications for debates on deliberative democracy.
1 Introduction
How can a group of individuals aggregate their individual judgments (beliefs, opin-
ions) on some logically connected propositions into collective judgments on these
propositions? In particular, how can a group do this under conditions of pluralism,
i.e., when individuals disagree on the propositions in question? This problem ￿judg-
ment aggregation ￿is discussed in a growing literature in philosophy, economics and
political science and generalizes earlier problems of social choice, notably preference
aggregation in the Condorcet-Arrow tradition.2 The problem arises in many di⁄er-
ent decision making bodies, ranging from legislative committees and multi-member
courts to expert advisory panels and monetary policy committees of a central bank.
Judgment aggregation is often illustrated by a paradox: the discursive (or doc-
trinal) paradox (Kornhauser and Sager 1986; Pettit 2001; Brennan 2001). To illus-
trate, suppose a university committee responsible for a tenure decision has to make
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of Economics (10/2004), UniversitØ de Caen (11/2004), the University of East Anglia (1/2005),
Northwestern University (5/2005), the 2005 SAET Conference in Vigo (6/2005), the University of
Hamburg (10/2005), IHPST, Paris (1/2006). We thank the participants at these occasions, the
anonymous referees of this paper and the editor, Bertil Tungodden, for comments.
2Preference aggregation becomes a case of judgment aggregation by expressing preference relations
as sets of binary ranking propositions in predicate logic (List and Pettit 2004; Dietrich and List 2007a).
1collective judgments on three propositions:3
a: The candidate is good at teaching.
b: The candidate is good at research.
c: The candidate deserves tenure.
According to the university￿ s rules, c (the ￿conclusion￿ ) is true if and only if a
and b (the ￿premises￿ ) are both true, formally c $ (a ^ b) (the ￿connection rule￿ ).
Suppose the committee has three members with judgments as shown in Table 1.
a b c $ (a ^ b) c
Individual 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual 2 Yes No Yes No
Individual 3 No Yes Yes No
Majority Yes Yes Yes No
Table 1: The discursive paradox
If the committee takes a majority vote on each proposition, then a and b are
each accepted and yet c is rejected (each by two thirds), despite the (unanimous)
acceptance of c $ (a ^ b). The discursive paradox shows that judgment aggregation
by propositionwise majority voting may lead to inconsistent collective judgments,
just as Condorcet￿ s paradox shows that preference aggregation by pairwise majority
voting may lead to intransitive collective preferences.
In response to the discursive paradox, two aggregation rules have been proposed
to avoid such inconsistencies (e.g., Pettit 2001; Chapman 1998, 2002; Bovens and
Rabinowicz 2006). Under premise-based voting, majority votes are taken on a and
b (the premises), but not on c (the conclusion), and the collective judgment on c is
derived using the connection rule c $ (a ^ b): in Table 1, a, b and c are all accep-
ted. Premise-based voting captures the deliberative democratic idea that collective
decisions on outcomes should be made on the basis of collectively decided reasons.
Here reasoning is ￿collectivized￿ , as Pettit (2001) describes it. Under conclusion-based
voting, a majority vote is taken only on c, and no collective judgments are made on a
or b: in Table 1, c is rejected and other propositions are left undecided. Conclusion-
based voting captures the minimal liberal idea that collective decisions should be
made only on (practical) outcomes and that the reasons behind such decisions should
remain private. Here collective decisions are ￿incompletely theorized￿in Sunstein￿ s
(1994) terms. (For a comparison between minimal liberal and comprehensive delib-
erative approaches to decision making, see List 2006.)
3This example is due to Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006).
2Abstracting from the discursive dilemma, List and Pettit (2002, 2004) have form-
alized judgment aggregation and proved that no judgment aggregation rule ensuring
consistency can satisfy some conditions inspired by Arrow￿ s conditions on preference
aggregation. This impossibility result has been strengthened and extended by Pauly
and van Hees (2006; see also van Hees 2007), Dietrich (2006), G￿rdenfors (2006) and
Dietrich and List (2007). Drawing on the model of ￿property spaces￿ , Nehring and
Puppe (2002, 2005) have o⁄ered the ￿rst characterizations of agendas of propositions
for which impossibility results hold (for a subsequent contribution, see Dokow and
Holzman 2005). Possibility results have been obtained by List (2003, 2004), Pigozzi
(2006) and Osherson and Vardi (forthcoming). Dietrich (2007) has developed an ex-
tension of the judgment aggregation model to richer logical languages for expressing
propositions, which we use in this paper. Related bodies of literature include those
on abstract aggregation theory (Wilson 1975)4 and on belief merging in computer
science (Konieczny and Pino-Perez 2002).
But one important question has received little attention in the literature on judg-
ment aggregation: Which aggregation rules are manipulable by strategic voting and
which are strategy-proof? The answer is not obvious, as strategy-proofness in the
familiar sense in economics is a preference-theoretic concept and preferences are not
primitives of judgment aggregation models. Yet the question matters for the design
and implementation of an aggregation rule in a collective decision making body such
as in the examples above. Ideally, we would like to ￿nd aggregation rules that lead
individuals to reveal their judgments truthfully. Indeed, if an aggregation rule cap-
tures the normatively desirable functional relation between individual and collective
judgments, then truthful revelation of these individual judgments (which are typic-
ally private information) is crucial for the (direct) implementation of that functional
relation.5
In this paper, we address this question. We ￿rst introduce a simple condition
of non-manipulability and characterize the class of non-manipulable judgment ag-
gregation rules. We then show that, under certain motivational assumptions about
4Wilson￿ s (1975) aggregation problem, where a group has to form yes/no views on several issues
based on individual views on them (subject to feasibility constraints), can be represented in judgment
aggregation. Unlike judgment aggregation, Wilson￿ s model cannot fully generally represent logical
entailment: its primitive is a consistency (feasibility) notion, from which an entailment relation can
be retrieved only for certain logical languages (Dietrich 2007).
5A functional relation between individual and collective judgments could be deemed normatively
desirable for a variety of reasons, such as epistemic or democratic legitimacy goals. The axiomatic
approach to social choice theory translates these goals into formal requirements on aggregation.
3individuals, our condition is equivalent to a game-theoretic strategy-proofness con-
dition similar to the one introduced by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975)
for preference aggregation.6 Our characterization of non-manipulable aggregation
rules then yields a characterization of strategy-proof aggregation rules. The relevant
motivational assumptions hold if agents want the group to make collective judg-
ments that match their own individual judgments (e.g., want the group to make
judgments that match what they consider the truth). In many other cases, such as
that of ￿reason-oriented￿ individuals (as de￿ned in Section 5), non-manipulability
and strategy-proofness may come signi￿cantly apart.
By introducing both a non-game-theoretic condition of non-manipulability and
a game-theoretic condition of strategy-proofness, we are able to distinguish between
opportunities for manipulation (which depend only on the aggregation rule in ques-
tion) and incentives for manipulation (which depend also on the motivations of the
decision-makers).
We prove that, for a general class of aggregation problems including the tenure
example above, there exists no non-manipulable judgment aggregation rule satisfy-
ing universal domain and some other mild conditions, an impossibility result similar
to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem on preference aggregation. Subsequently, we
identify various ways to avoid the impossibility result. We also show that our default
conditions of non-manipulability and strategy-proofness fall into general families of
conditions and discuss other conditions in these families. In the case of strategy-
proofness, these conditions correspond to di⁄erent motivational assumptions about
the decision makers. In the tenure example, conclusion-based voting is strategy-proof
in a strong sense, but produces no collective judgments on the premises. Premise-
based voting satis￿es only the weaker condition of strategy-proofness for ￿reason-
oriented￿individuals. Surprisingly, although premise- and conclusion-based voting
are regarded in the literature as two diametrically opposed aggregation rules, they
are strategically equivalent if individuals are ￿outcome-oriented￿ , generating identical
judgments in equilibrium. Our results not only introduce game-theoretic considera-
tions into the theory of judgment aggregation, but they are also relevant to debates on
democratic theory as premise-based voting has been advocated, and conclusion-based
voting rejected, by proponents of deliberative democracy (Pettit 2001).
There is, of course, a related literature on manipulability and strategy-proofness
in preference aggregation, following Gibbard￿ s and Satterthwaite￿ s classic contribu-
6Our de￿nition of strategy-proofness in judgment aggregation draws on List (2002b, 2004), where
su¢ cient conditions for strategy-proofness in (sequential) judgment aggregation are given.
4tions (e.g., Taylor 2002, 2005; Saporiti and ThomØ 2005). An important branch
of this literature, from which several corollaries for judgment aggregation can be
derived, has considered preference aggregation over options that are vectors of bin-
ary properties (Barber￿ et al. 1993, 1997; Nehring and Puppe 2002). A parallel to
judgment aggregation can be drawn by identifying propositions with properties; a
disanalogy lies in the structure of the informational input to the aggregation rule.
While judgment aggregation rules collect a single judgment set from each individual
(expressed in a possibly rich logical language), preference aggregation rules collect an
entire preference ordering over vectors of properties. Whether or not an individual￿ s
most-preferred vector of properties (in preference aggregation) can be identi￿ed with
her judgment set (in judgment aggregation) depends precisely on the motivational
assumptions we make about this individual.
Another important related literature is that on the paradox of multiple elections
(Brams et al. 1997, 1998; Kelly 1989). Here a group also aggregates individual
votes on multiple propositions, and the winning combination can be one that no
voter individually endorses. However, given the di⁄erent focus of that work, the
propositions in question are not explicitly modelled as logically interconnected as
in our present model of judgment aggregation. The formal proofs of all the results
reported in the main text are given in the Appendix.
2 The basic model
We consider a group of individuals N = f1;2;:::;ng, where n ￿ 2.7 The group has
to make collective judgments on logically connected propositions.
2.1 Representing propositions in formal logic
Propositions are represented in a logical language, de￿ned by two components:
￿ a non-empty set L of formal expressions representing propositions;
the language has a negation symbol : (￿not￿ ), where for each
proposition p in L, its negation :p is also contained in L.
￿ an entailment relation ￿, where, for each set of propositions A ￿ L
and each proposition p 2 L, A ￿ p is read as ￿A logically entails p￿ .8
7Although no discursive paradox arises for n = 2, our results below still hold: Under Theorem
2￿ s other conditions, non-manipulability requires a dictatorship of one of the two individuals. The
unanimity rule, while also non-manipulable, violates completeness of collective judgments.
8￿ can be interpreted either as semantic entailment or as syntactic derivability (usually denoted
‘). The two interpretations give rise to semantic or syntactic notions of rationality, respectively.
5We call a set of propositions A ￿ L inconsistent if A ￿ p and A ￿ :p for some
p 2 L, and consistent otherwise. We require the logical language to have certain
minimal properties (Dietrich 2007; Dietrich and List 2007a).9
The most familiar logical language is (classical) propositional logic, containing a
given set of atomic propositions a, b, c, ..., such as the propositions about the candid-
ate￿ s teaching, research and tenure in the example above, and compound propositions
with the logical connectives : (￿not￿ ), ^ (￿and￿ ), _ (￿or￿ ), ! (￿if-then￿ ), $ (￿if
and only if￿ ), such as the connection rule c $ (a ^ b) in the tenure example.10 Ex-
amples of valid logical entailments in propositional logic are fa;a ! bg ￿ b (￿modus
ponens￿ ), fa ! b;:bg ￿ :a (￿modus tollens￿ ), whereas the entailment fa _ bg ￿ a is
not valid. Examples of consistent sets are fa;a _ bg, f:a;:b;a ! bg, and examples
of inconsistent ones are fa;:ag, fa;a ! b;:bg and fa;b;c $ (a ^ b);:cg.
We use classical propositional logic in our examples, but our results also hold for
other, more expressive logical languages such as the following:
￿ predicate logic, which includes relation symbols and the quanti￿ers
￿there exists ...￿and ￿for all ...￿ ;
￿ modal logic, which includes the operators ￿it￿ s necessary that ...￿
and ￿it￿ s possible that ...￿ ;
￿ deontic logic, which includes the operators ￿it￿ s permissible that ...￿
and ￿it￿ s obligatory that ...￿ ;
￿ conditional logic, which allows the expression of counterfactual or
subjunctive conditionals.
Many di⁄erent propositions that might be considered by a multi-member decision
making body (ranging from legislative committees to expert panels) can be formally
represented in an appropriate such language. Crucially, a logical language allows
us to capture the fact that, in many decision problems, di⁄erent propositions, such
as the reasons for a particular tenure outcome and the resulting outcome itself, are
mutually interconnected.
9L1 (self-entailment): For all p 2 L, fpg ￿ p. L2 (monotonicity): For all p 2 L and A ￿ B ￿ L, if
A ￿ p then B ￿ p. L3 (completability): ; is consistent, and each consistent set A ￿ L has a consistent
superset B ￿ L containing a member of each pair p;:p 2 L. L1-L3 are jointly equivalent to three
conditions on the consistency notion: each pair fp;:pg ￿ L is inconsistent; if A ￿ L is inconsistent,
so are its supersets B ￿ L; and L3 holds. See Dietrich (forthcoming) for details.
10L is the smallest set such that (i) a, b, c, ...2 L and (ii) if p;q 2 L then :p,(p ^ q),(p _ q),(p !
q),(p $ q) 2 L. We drop brackets when there is no ambiguity. Entailment (￿) is de￿ned standardly.
62.2 The agenda
The agenda is the set of propositions on which judgments are to be made; it is a
non-empty subset X ￿ L, where X is a union of proposition-negation pairs fp;:pg
(with p not a negated proposition). For simplicity, we assume that double negations
cancel each other out, i.e., ::p stands for p.11
Two important examples are conjunctive and disjunctive agendas in propositional
logic. A conjunctive agenda is X = fa1; :::; ak; c; c $ (a1 ^ ￿￿￿ ^ ak)g+neg, where
a1;:::;ak are premises (k ￿ 1), c is a conclusion, and c $ (a1 ^ ￿￿￿ ^ ak) is the
connection rule. We write Y +neg as an abbreviation for fp;:p : p 2 Y g. To de￿ne a
disjunctive agenda, we replace c $ (a1^￿￿￿^ak) with c $ (a1_￿￿￿_ak). Conjunctive
and disjunctive agendas arise in decision problems in which some outcome (c) is to
be decided on the basis of some reasons (a1;:::;ak). In the tenure example above,
we have a conjunctive agenda with k = 2.12
Other examples are agendas involving conditionals (in propositional or conditional
logic) such as X = fa;b;a ! bg+neg. Here proposition a might state some political
goal, proposition a ! b might state what the pursuit of a requires, and proposition
b might state the consequence to be drawn. Alternatively, proposition a might be an
empirical premise, a ! b a causal hypothesis, and b the resulting prediction.
Finally, we can also represent standard preference aggregation problems within
our model. Here we use a predicate logic with a set of constants K representing
options (jKj ￿ 3) and a two-place predicate R representing preferences, where, for
any x;y 2 K, the proposition xRy is interpreted as ￿x is preferable to y￿ . Now the
preference agenda is the set X = fxRy : x;y 2 Kg+neg (Dietrich and List 2007a).13
The nature of a judgment aggregation problem depends on what propositions are
contained in the agenda and how they are interconnected. Our main characteriza-
tion theorem holds for any agenda of propositions. Our main impossibility theorem
holds for a large class of agendas, de￿ned below. We also discuss applications to the
important cases of conjunctive and disjunctive agendas.
11Hereafter, when we write :p and p is already of the form :q, we mean q (rather than ::q).
12Although we here interpret connection rules c $ (a1 ^ ￿￿￿ ^ ak) as material biimplications, one
may prefer to interpret them as subjunctive biimplications (in a conditional logic). This changes
the logical relations within conjunctive agendas: more judgment sets are consistent, including
f:a1;:::;:ak;:c;:(c $ (a1 ^ ￿￿￿ ^ ak))g. As a result, our impossibility results (Theorems 2-3 and
Corollary 2) do not apply to conjunctive agendas in the revised sense; instead, we obtain stronger
possibility results. Analogous remarks hold for disjunctive agendas. See Dietrich (forthcoming).
13The entailment relation ￿ in this logical language is de￿ned by A ￿ p if and only if A[Z entails
p in the standard sense of predicate logic, where Z is the set of rationality conditions on preferences
f(8v)vRv; (8v1)(8v2)(8v3)((v1Rv2 ^ v2Rv3) ! v1Rv3); (8v1)(8v2)(: v1=v2 ! (v1Rv2 _ v2Rv1))g.
72.3 Individual and collective judgments
Each individual i￿ s judgment set is a subset Ai ￿ X, where p 2 Ai means that
individual i accepts proposition p. As the agenda typically contains both atomic
propositions and compound ones, our de￿nition of a judgment set captures the fact
that an individual makes judgments both on free-standing atomic propositions and
on their interconnections; and di⁄erent individuals may disagree with each other on
both kinds of propositions.
A judgment set Ai is consistent if it is a consistent set of propositions as de￿ned
for the logic; Ai is complete if it contains a member of each proposition-negation pair
p;:p 2 X. A pro￿le (of individual judgment sets) is an n-tuple (A1;:::;An).
A (judgment) aggregation rule is a function F that assigns to each admissible
pro￿le (A1;:::;An) a collective judgment set F(A1;:::;An) = A ￿ X, where p 2 A
means that the group accepts proposition p. The set of admissible pro￿les is called
the domain of F, denoted Domain(F). Several results below require the following.
Universal Domain. Domain(F) is the set of all possible pro￿les of consistent and
complete individual judgment sets.
2.4 Examples of aggregation rules
We give four important examples of aggregation rules satisfying universal domain,
as just introduced. The ￿rst two rules are de￿ned for any agenda, the last two only
for conjunctive (or disjunctive) agendas (the present de￿nitions are simpli￿ed, but a
generalization is possible).
Propositionwise majority voting. For each (A1;:::;An) 2 Domain(F),
F(A1;:::;An) is the set of all propositions p 2 X such that more individuals i have
p 2 Ai than p = 2 Ai.
Dictatorship of individual i: For each (A1,...,An) 2 Domain(F), F(A1,...,An)=Ai.
Premise-based voting. For each (A1;:::;An) 2 Domain(F), F(A1;:::;An) is the
set containing
￿ any premise aj if and only if more i have aj 2 Ai than aj = 2 Ai,
￿ the connection rule c $ (a1 ^ ￿￿￿ ^ ak),
￿ the conclusion c if and only if aj 2 F(A1;:::;An) for all premises aj,
￿ any negated proposition :p if and only if p = 2 F(A1;:::;An).14
14For a disjunctive agenda, replace ￿c $ (a1 ^ ￿￿￿ ^ ak)￿with ￿c $ (a1 _ ￿￿￿ _ ak)￿and ￿for all
premises aj￿with ￿for some premise aj￿ .
8Here votes are taken only on each premise, and the conclusion is decided by using
an exogenously given connection rule.
Conclusion-based voting. For each (A1,...,An) 2 Domain(F), F(A1,...,An) is the
set containing
￿ only the conclusion c if more i have c 2 Ai than c = 2 Ai,
￿ only the negation of the conclusion :c otherwise.
Here a vote is taken only on the conclusion, and no collective judgments are made
on other propositions.
Dictatorships and premise-based voting always generate consistent and complete
collective judgments; propositionwise majority voting sometimes generates inconsist-
ent ones (recall Table 1), and conclusion-based voting always generates incomplete
ones (no judgments on the premises).
In debates on the discursive paradox and democratic theory, several arguments
have been o⁄ered for the superiority of premise-based voting over conclusion-based
voting. One such argument draws on a deliberative conception of democracy, which
emphasizes that collective decisions on conclusions should follow from collectively
decided premises (Pettit 2001; Chapman 2002). A second argument draws on the
Condorcet jury theorem. If all the propositions are factually true or false and each
individual has a probability greater than 1/2 of judging each premise correctly, then,
under certain probabilistic independence assumptions, premise-based voting has a
higher probability of producing a correct collective judgment on the conclusion than
conclusion-based voting (Grofman 1985; Bovens and Rabinowicz 2006; List 2005,
2006). Here we show that, with regard to strategic manipulability, premise-based
voting performs worse than conclusion-based voting.
3 Non-manipulability
When can an aggregation rule be manipulated by strategic voting? We ￿rst introduce
a new condition of non-manipulability, not yet game-theoretic. Below we prove that,
under certain motivational assumptions about the individuals, our non-manipulability
condition is equivalent to a game-theoretic strategy-proofness condition. We also
notice that non-manipulability and strategy-proofness may sometimes come apart.
93.1 An example
To give a simple example, we use the language of incentives to manipulate, although
our subsequent formal analysis focuses on underlying opportunities for manipulation;
we return to incentives formally in Section 4. Recall the pro￿le in Table 1. Suppose,
for the moment, that the three committee members each care only about reaching
a collective judgment on the conclusion (c) that agrees with their own individual
judgments on the conclusion, and that they do not care about the collective judgments
on the premises. What matters to them is the ￿nal tenure decision, not the underlying
reasons; they are ￿outcome-oriented￿ , as de￿ned precisely later.
Suppose ￿rst the committee uses conclusion-based voting; a vote is taken only
on c. Then, clearly, no committee member has an incentive to express an untruthful
judgment on c. Individual 1, who wants the committee to accept c, has no incentive
to vote against c. Individuals 2 and 3, who want the committee to reject c, have no
incentive to vote in favour of c.
But suppose now the committee uses premise-based voting; votes are taken on a
and b. What are the members￿incentives? Individual 1, who wants the committee
to accept c, has no incentive to vote against a or b. But at least one of individuals
2 or 3 has an incentive to vote untruthfully. Speci￿cally, if individuals 1 and 2 vote
truthfully, then individual 3 has an incentive to vote untruthfully; and if individuals
1 and 3 vote truthfully, then individual 2 has such an incentive.
To illustrate, assume that individual 2 votes truthfully for a and against b. Then
the committee accepts a, regardless of individual 3￿ s vote. So, if individual 3 votes
truthfully for b, then the committee accepts b and hence c. But if she votes untruth-
fully against b, then the committee rejects b and hence c. As individual 3 wants the
committee to reject c, she has an incentive to vote untruthfully on b. (In summary,
if individual judgments are as in Table 1, voting untruthfully against both a and
b weakly dominates voting truthfully for individuals 2 and 3.) Ferejohn (2003) has
made this observation informally.
3.2 A non-manipulability condition
To formalize these observations, some de￿nitions are needed. We say that one judg-
ment set, A, agrees with another, A￿, on a proposition p 2 X if either both or none of
A and A￿ contains p; A disagrees with A￿ on p otherwise. Two pro￿les are i-variants
of each other if they coincide for all individuals except possibly i.
An aggregation rule F is manipulable at the pro￿le (A1;:::;An) 2 Domain(F)
10by individual i on proposition p 2 X if Ai disagrees with F(A1;:::;An) on p, but
Ai agrees with F(A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An) on p for some i-variant (A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An) 2
Domain(F).
For example, at the pro￿le in Table 1, premise-based voting is manipulable by
individual 3 on c (by submitting A￿
3 = f:a;:b;c $ (a ^ b);:cg instead of A3 =
f:a;b;c $ (a^b);:cg) and also by individual 2 on c (by submitting A￿
2 = f:a;:b;c $
(a ^ b);:cg instead of A2 = fa;:b;c $ (a ^ b);:cg).
Manipulability thus de￿ned is the existence of an opportunity for some indi-
vidual(s) to manipulate the collective judgment(s) on some proposition(s) by express-
ing untruthful individual judgments (perhaps on other propositions). The question
of when such opportunities for manipulation translate into incentives for manipula-
tion is a separate question. Whether a rational individual will act on a particular
opportunity for manipulation depends on the individual￿ s precise motivation and par-
ticularly on how much he or she cares about the various propositions involved in a
possible act of manipulation. To illustrate, in our example above, we have assumed
that individuals care only about the ￿nal tenure decision, implying that they do in-
deed have incentives to act on their opportunities for manipulation. We discuss this
issue in detail when we introduce preferences over judgment sets below.
Our de￿nition of manipulability leads to a corresponding de￿nition of
non-manipulability. Let Y ￿ X.
Non-manipulability on Y . F is not manipulable at any pro￿le by any individual
on any proposition in Y . Equivalently, for any individual i, pro￿le (A1;:::;An) 2
Domain(F) and proposition p 2 Y , if Ai disagrees with F(A1;:::;An) on p, then Ai
still disagrees with F(A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An) on p for every i-variant (A1; :::; A￿
i; :::;
An) 2 Domain(F).
This de￿nition speci￿es a family of non-manipulability conditions, one for each
Y ￿ X. Non-manipulability on Y requires the absence of opportunities for manip-
ulation on the subset Y of the agenda. If Y1 ￿ Y2, then non-manipulability on Y2
implies non-manipulability on Y1. If we refer just to ￿non-manipulability￿ , without
adding ￿on Y ￿ , then we mean the default case Y = X.
3.3 A characterization result
When is a judgment aggregation rule non-manipulable? We now characterize the class
of non-manipulable aggregation rules in terms of an independence condition and a
monotonicity condition. Let Y ￿ X.
11Independence on Y . For any proposition p 2 Y and pro￿les (A1;:::;An); (A￿
1;:::;
A￿
n) 2 Domain(F), if [for all individuals i, p 2 Ai if and only if p 2 A￿
i] then
[p 2 F(A1;:::;An) if and only if p 2 F(A￿
1;:::;A￿
n)].
Monotonicity on Y . For any proposition p 2 Y , individual i and pair of i-variants
(A1;:::;An);(A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An) 2 Domain(F) with p = 2 Ai and p 2 A￿
i, [p 2
F(A1;:::;An) implies p 2 F(A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An)].
Weak Monotonicity on Y . For any proposition p 2 Y , individual i and judgment
sets A1; :::; Ai￿1; Ai+1; :::; An, if there exists a pair of i-variants (A1;:::;An);
(A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An) 2 Domain(F) with p = 2 Ai and p 2 A￿
i, then for some such pair
[p 2 F(A1;:::;An) implies p 2 F(A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An)].
Informally, independence on Y states that the collective judgment on each pro-
position in Y depends only on individual judgments on that proposition and not on
individual judgments on other propositions. Monotonicity (respectively, weak mono-
tonicity) on Y states that an additional individual￿ s support for some proposition in Y
never (respectively, not always) reverses the collective acceptance of that proposition
(other individuals￿judgments remaining ￿xed).
Again, we have de￿ned families of conditions. If we refer just to ￿independence￿
or ￿(weak) monotonicity￿ , without adding ￿on Y ￿ , then we mean the default case
Y = X.
Theorem 1 Let X be any agenda. For each Y ￿ X, if F satis￿es universal domain,
the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) F is non-manipulable on Y ;
(ii) F is independent on Y and monotonic on Y ;
(iii) F is independent on Y and weakly monotonic on Y .
Without a domain assumption (e.g., for a subdomain of the universal domain),
(ii) and (iii) are equivalent, and each implies (i).15
No assumption on the consistency or completeness of collective judgments is
needed. The result can be seen as a preference-free analogue in judgment aggreg-
ation of a classic characterization of strategy-proof preference aggregation rules by
Barber￿ et al. (1993).
15Under universal domain, (i), (ii) and (iii) are also equivalent to the conjunction of independ-
ence on Y and judgment-set-wise monotonicity on Y , which requires that, for all individuals i
and all i-variants (A1;:::;An);(A1;:::;A
￿
i;:::;An) 2 Domain(F), if A
￿
i = F(A1;:::;An) then
F(A1;:::;A
￿
i;:::;An) \ Y = F(A1;:::;An) \ Y .
12In the case of a conjunctive (or disjunctive) agenda, conclusion-based voting is
independent and monotonic, hence non-manipulable; premise-based voting is not in-
dependent, hence manipulable. But on the set of premises Y = fa1;:::;akg+neg
premise-based voting is independent and monotonic (as premise-based voting on
those premises is simply equivalent to propositionwise majority voting), and hence it
is non-manipulable on Y .
3.4 An impossibility result
Ideally, we want to achieve non-manipulability simpliciter and not just on some subset
of the agenda. Conclusion-based voting is non-manipulable in this strong sense, but
generates incomplete collective judgments. Are there any non-manipulable aggrega-
tion rules that generate consistent and complete collective judgments? We now show
that, for a general class of agendas, including the agenda in the tenure example above,
all non-manipulable aggregation rules satisfying some mild conditions are dictatorial.
To de￿ne this class of agendas, we de￿ne the notion of path-connectedness, a
variant of the notion of total-blockedness introduced by Nehring and Puppe (2002)
(originally in the model of ￿property spaces￿ ).16 Informally, an agenda of proposi-
tions under consideration is path-connected if any two propositions in the agenda are
logically connected with each other, either directly or indirectly, via a sequence of
(conditional) logical entailments.
Formally, proposition p conditionally entails proposition q if fp;:qg[Y is incon-
sistent for some Y ￿ X consistent with p and with :q. An agenda X is path-connected
if, for all contingent17 propositions p;q 2 X, there is a sequence p1;p2;:::;pk 2 X (of
length k ￿ 1) with p = p1 and q = pk such that p1 conditionally entails p2; p2 con-
ditionally entails p3; :::; pk￿1 conditionally entails pk. The class of path-connected
agendas includes conjunctive and disjunctive agendas (see the Appendix) and the
preference agenda (Nehring 2003; Dietrich and List 2007a), which can be used to
represent Condorcet-Arrow preference aggregation problems.
Consider the following conditions on an aggregation rule in addition to universal
domain.
Collective Rationality. For any pro￿le (A1;:::;An) 2 Domain(F), F(A1; :::; An)
is consistent and complete.18
16For a compact logic, path-connectedness is equivalent to total blockedness; in the general case,
path-connectedness is weaker.
17We call a proposition p 2 L contingent if both fpg and f:pg are consistent.
18Although completeness is conventionally called a rationality requirement, one may consider con-
13Responsiveness. For any contingent proposition p 2 X, there exist two pro-
￿les (A1;:::;An), (A￿
1;:::;A￿
n) 2 Domain(F) such that p 2 F(A1;:::;An) and
p = 2 F(A￿
1;:::;A￿
n).
Theorem 2 For a path-connected agenda X (e.g., a conjunctive, disjunctive or pref-
erence agenda), an aggregation rule F satis￿es universal domain, collective rational-
ity, responsiveness and non-manipulability if and only if F is a dictatorship of some
individual.
For the important case of compact logical languages, this result also follows from
Theorem 1 above and Nehring and Puppe￿ s (2002) characterization of monotonic
and independent aggregation rules for totally blocked agendas.19 Theorem 2 is the
judgment aggregation analogue of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem on preference
aggregation, which shows that dictatorships are the only strategy-proof social choice
functions that satisfy universal domain, have three or more options in their range and
always produce a determinate winner (Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975). Below we
restate Theorem 2 using a game-theoretic strategy-proofness condition.
In the special case of the preference agenda, however, there is an interesting
disanalogy between Theorem 2 and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. As a col-
lectively rational judgment aggregation rule for the preference agenda represents an
Arrowian social welfare function, Theorem 2 establishes an impossibility result on
the non-manipulability of social welfare functions (generating orderings as in Arrow￿ s
framework) as opposed to social choice functions (generating winning options as in
the Gibbard-Satterthwaite framework); for a related result, see Bossert and Storcken
(1992).
If the agenda is not path-connected, then there may exist non-dictatorial aggreg-
ation rules satisfying all of Theorem 2￿ s conditions; examples of such agendas are not
only trivial agendas (containing a single proposition-negation pair or several logically
independent such pairs), but also agendas involving only conditionals, including the
simple example X = fa;b;a ! bg+neg (Dietrich forthcoming).
By contrast, for atomically closed or atomic agendas, special cases of path-connected
agendas with very rich logical connections, an even stronger impossibility result holds,
in which Theorem 2￿ s responsiveness condition is signi￿cantly weakened.20
sistency more important. But if the agenda includes all those propositions on which collective judg-
ments are (practically) required, completeness seems reasonable. Below we discuss relaxing it.
19Nehring and Puppe￿ s result implies that the theorem￿ s agenda assumption is maximally weak.
20Agenda X is atomically closed if (i) X belongs to classical propositional logic, (ii) if an atomic
proposition a occurs in some p 2 X then a 2 X, and (iii) for any atomic propositions a;b 2 X, we
14Weak Responsiveness. The aggregation rule is non-constant. Equivalently, there
exist two pro￿les (A1;:::;An), (A￿
1;:::;A￿




Theorem 3 For an atomically closed or atomic agenda X, an aggregation rule F sat-
is￿es universal domain, collective rationality, weak responsiveness and
non-manipulability if and only if F is a dictatorship of some individual.
Given Theorem 1 above, this result follows immediately from theorems by Pauly
and van Hees (2006) (for atomically closed agendas) and Dietrich (2006) (for atomic
ones).
3.5 Avoiding the impossibility result
To ￿nd non-manipulable and non-dictatorial aggregation rules, we must relax at least
one condition in Theorems 2 or 3. Non-responsive rules are usually unattractive. Per-
mitting inconsistent collective judgments also seems unattractive. But the following
may sometimes be defensible.
Incompleteness. For a conjunctive or disjunctive agenda, conclusion-based voting
is non-manipulable. It generates incomplete collective judgments and is only weakly
responsive; this may be acceptable when no collective judgments on the premises are
required. More generally, propositionwise supermajority rules ￿requiring a superma-
jority of a particular size (or even unanimity) for the acceptance of a proposition ￿
are consistent and non-manipulable (by Theorem 1), again at the expense of violating
completeness as neither member of a pair p;:p 2 X might obtain the required su-
permajority. For a ￿nite agenda (or compact logical languages), a supermajority rule
requiring at least m votes for the acceptance of any proposition guarantees collective
consistency if and only if m > n ￿ n=z, where z is the size of the largest minimal
inconsistent set Z ￿ X (Dietrich and List 2007b; List 2004).
Domain restriction. By suitably restricting the domain of propositionwise major-
ity voting, this rule becomes consistent; it is also non-manipulable as it is independent
and monotonic. This result holds, for example, for the domain of all pro￿les of con-
sistent and complete individual judgment sets satisfying the structure condition of
have a ^ b;a ^ :b;:a ^ b;:a ^ :b 2 X (Pauly and van Hees 2006). X is atomic if f:p : p is an
atom of Xg is inconsistent, where p 2 X is an atom of X if p is consistent but inconsistent with
some member of each pair q;:q 2 X (Dietrich 2006). In both cases, X must contain two (or more)
contingent propositions p and q, with p not equivalent to q or :q.
15unidimensional alignment (List 2003).21 Informally, unidimensional alignment re-
quires that the individuals can be aligned from left to right (under any interpretation
of ￿left￿and ￿right￿ ) such that, for each proposition on the agenda, the individu-
als accepting the proposition are either exclusively to the left, or exclusively to the
right, of those rejecting it. This structure condition captures a shared unidimensional
conceptualization of the decision problem by the decision-makers. In debates on delib-
erative democracy, it is sometimes hypothesized that group deliberation may reduce
disagreement so as to bring about such a shared unidimensional conceptualization
(Miller 1992; Dryzek and List 2003), sometimes also described as a ￿meta-consensus￿
(List 2002a).
4 Strategy-proofness
Non-manipulability is not yet a game-theoretic concept. We now de￿ne strategy-
proofness, a game-theoretic concept that depends on individual preferences (over
judgment sets held by the group). We identify assumptions on individual prefer-
ences that render strategy-proofness equivalent to non-manipulability and discuss
the plausibility of these assumptions.
4.1 Preference relations over judgment sets
We interpret a judgment aggregation problem as a game with n players (the indi-
viduals).22 The game form is given by the aggregation rule: each individual￿ s possible
actions are the di⁄erent judgment sets the individual can submit to the aggregation
rule (which may or may not coincide with the individual￿ s true judgment set); the
outcomes are the collective judgment sets generated by the aggregation rule.
To specify the game fully, we assume that each individual, in addition to holding
a true judgment set Ai, also has a preference relation %i over all possible outcomes
of the game, i.e., over all possible collective judgment sets of the form A ￿ X. For
any two judgment sets, A;B ￿ X, A %i B means that individual i weakly prefers the
group to endorse A as the collective judgment set rather than B. We assume that %i
is re￿ exive and transitive, but do not require it to be complete.23 Individuals need
21For a related result on preference aggregation, see Saporiti and ThomØ (2005).
22For an earlier version of this game-theoretic interpretation of judgment aggregation, the notion of
closeness-respecting preferences over judgment sets, and a su¢ cient condition for strategy-proofness
(in a sequential context), see List (2002b, 2004).
23%i is: re￿exive if, for any A, A %i A; transitive if, for any A, B, C, A %i B and B %i C implies
A %i C; complete if, for any distinct A, B, A %i B or B %i A.
16not be able to rank all pairs of judgment sets relative to each other; in principle, our
model allows studying a further relaxation of these conditions.
What preferences over collective judgment sets can we expect an individual i to
hold when i￿ s judgment set is Ai? The answer is not straightforward, and it may
even be di¢ cult to say anything about i￿ s preferences on the basis of Ai alone. To
illustrate this, consider ￿rst a single proposition p, say, ￿CO2 emissions lead to global
warming￿ . If individual i judges that p (i.e., p 2 Ai), it does not necessarily follow
that i wants the group to judge that p. Just imagine that i owns an oil company
which bene￿ts from low taxes on CO2 emissions, and that taxes are increased if and
only if the group judges that p. In general, accepting p and wanting the group to
accept p are conceptually distinct (though the literature is often unclear about this
distinction). Whether acceptance and desire of group acceptance happen to coincide
in a particular case is an empirical question.24 There are important situations in which
the two may indeed be reasonably expected to coincide. An important example is that
of epistemically motivated individuals: here each individual prefers group judgments
that she considers closer to the truth, where she may consider her own judgments as
the truth. A non-epistemically motivated individual prefers judgment sets for reasons
other than the truth, for example because she personally bene￿ts from group actions
resulting from the collective endorsement of some judgment sets rather than others.25
We now give examples of possible assumptions (empirical claims) on how the
individuals￿preferences are related to their judgment sets. Which of these assump-
tions is correct depends on the group of individuals and the aggregation problem in
question. Di⁄erent assumptions capture di⁄erent motivations of the individuals, as
illustrated above. Speci￿cally, the assumption of ￿unrestricted￿preferences captures
the case where an individual￿ s preferences are not in any systematic way linked to her
judgments; the assumption of ￿top-respecting￿preferences and the stronger one of
24This argument identi￿es accepting with believing, thus interpreting judgment sets as (binary)
belief sets, and judgment aggregation as the aggregation of (binary) belief sets into group belief
sets. Although this interpretation is standard, other interpretations are possible. If accepting means
desiring, judgment aggregation is the aggregation of (binary) desire sets into group desire sets. It is
then more plausible that i wants the group to accept (desire) the propositions that i accepts (desires).
25Even non-epistemically motivated individuals may sometimes prefer group judgments that match
their own individual judgments. Suppose each individual is motivated by her desires over outcomes
of group actions, which depend on the state of the world. Suppose, further, all individuals hold the
same desires over outcomes but di⁄erent beliefs about the state of the world, and each individual is
convinced that her own beliefs are true and that their collective acceptance would lead to the desired
outcomes. Such individuals may want the group judgments to match their individual judgments, but
mainly to satisfy their desires over outcomes rather than to bring about true group beliefs.
17￿closeness-respecting￿preferences capture situations in which agents would like group
judgments to agree with their own judgments. We use a function C that assigns to
each possible judgment set Ai a non-empty set C(Ai) of (re￿ exive and transitive)
preference relations that are considered ￿compatible￿ with Ai (i.e., possible given
Ai). Our examples of preference assumptions can be stated formally as follows (in
increasing order of strength).
Unrestricted preferences. For each Ai, C(Ai) is the set of all preference relations
% (regardless of Ai).
Top-respecting preferences. For each Ai, C(Ai) is the set of all preference relations
% for which Ai is a most preferred judgment set, i.e., C(Ai) = f%: Ai % B for all
judgment sets Bg.
To de￿ne "closeness-respecting" preferences, we say that a judgment set B is at
least as close to Ai on some Y ￿ X as another judgment set B￿ if, for all propositions
p 2 Y , if B￿ agrees with Ai on p, then B also agrees with Ai on p. For example,
f:a;b;c $ (a^b);:cg is at least as close to fa;b;c $ (a^b);cg on X as f:a;:b;c $
(a^b);:cg,26 whereas f:a;b;c $ (a^b);:cg and fa;:b;c $ (a^b);:cg are unranked
in terms of relative closeness to fa;b;c $ (a ^ b);cg on X. We say that a preference
relation % respects closeness to Ai on Y if, for any two judgment sets B and B￿, if
B is at least as close to Ai as B￿ on Y , then B % B￿.
Closeness-respecting preferences on Y (for some Y ￿ X). For each Ai, C(Ai) is
the set of all preference relations % that respect closeness to Ai on Y , and we write
C = CY .
In the important case Y = X, we drop the reference ￿on Y ￿and speak of closeness-
respecting preferences simpliciter. One element of CX(Ai) is the (complete) preference
relation induced by the Hamming distance to Ai.27 Below we analyse the important
cases of ￿reason-oriented￿and ￿outcome-oriented￿preferences, where Y is given by
particular subsets of X. Generally, if Y1 ￿ Y2, then, for all Ai, CY1(Ai) ￿ CY2(Ai).
26In fact, it is ￿closer￿ , where ￿closer than￿is the strong component of ￿at least as close as￿ .
27The Hamming distance between two judgment sets B and B
￿ is d(B;B
￿) := jfp 2 X : B
and B
￿ disagree on pgj. The preference relation ￿ induced by Hamming distance to Ai is de￿ned,
for any B;B
￿, by [B ￿ B
￿ if and only if d(B;Ai) ￿ d(B
￿;Ai)]. For the preference agenda, a
preference relation ￿ over judgment sets (each representing a preference ordering over the option
set K) represents a meta-preference over preference orderings. Bossert and Storcken (1992) use the
Kemeny distance between preference orderings to obtain such a meta-preference. For related work
on distances between preferences and theories, see Baigent (1987) and Schulte (2005), respectively.
184.2 A strategy-proofness condition
Given a speci￿cation of the function C, an aggregation rule is strategy-proof for
C if, for any pro￿le, any individual and any preference relation compatible with
the individual￿ s judgment set (according to C), the individual (weakly) prefers the
outcome of expressing her judgment set truthfully to any outcome that would result
from misrepresenting her judgment set.
Strategy-proofness for C. For any individual i, pro￿le (A1; :::; An)
2 Domain(F) and preference relation %i2 C(Ai), F(A1; :::; An) %i F(A1; :::;
A￿
i; :::; An) for every i-variant (A1 :::;A￿
i;:::;An) 2 Domain(F):28
If the aggregation rule F has the universal domain, then strategy-proofness implies
that truthfulness is a weakly dominant strategy for every individual.29 Our de￿nition
of strategy-proofness (generalizing List 2002b, 2004) is similar to Gibbard￿ s (1973)
and Satterthwaite￿ s (1975) classical one and related to other de￿nitions of strategy-
proofness in the literature on preference aggregation (particularly, for CX, those by
Barber￿ et al. 1993, 1997 and Nehring and Puppe 2002, employing the notion of
generalized single-peaked preferences).
As in the case of non-manipulability above, we have de￿ned a family of strategy-
proofness conditions, one for each speci￿cation of C. This means that di⁄erent mo-
tivational assumptions about the individuals lead to di⁄erent strategy-proofness con-
ditions. If individuals have very restrictive preferences over possible judgment sets,
then strategy-proofness is easier to achieve than if their preferences are largely un-
restricted. Formally, if two functions C1 and C2 are such that C1 ￿ C2 (i.e., for
each Ai, C1(Ai) ￿ C2(Ai)), then strategy-proofness for C1 is less demanding than
(i.e., implied by) strategy-proofness for C2. The more preference relations are com-
patible with each individual judgment set, the more demanding is the corresponding
requirement of strategy-proofness.
28Our de￿nition of strategy-proofness can be generalized by admitting a di⁄erent function Ci for
each individual i. This removes a homogeneity assumption, whereby, if individuals i and j hold the
same judgment set Ai = Aj, then their preference relations fall into the same set C(Ai) = C(Aj).
The homogeneity assumption is undemanding when C(Ai) is large.
29This interpretation of strategy-proofness holds for product domains. For certain subdomains of
the universal domain (i.e., non-product domains), we do not have a strictly well de￿ned game, but
our de￿nition of strategy-proofness remains applicable and can be reinterpreted as one of ￿conditional
strategy-proofness￿for non-product domains, as discussed by Saporiti and ThomØ (2005).
194.3 The equivalence of strategy-proofness and non-manipulability
What is the logical relation between non-manipulability as de￿ned above and strategy-
proofness? We show that, if preferences are closeness-respecting (on some Y ￿ X),
then an equivalence between these two concepts arises. Let X be any agenda.
Theorem 4 For each Y ￿ X, F is strategy-proof for CY if and only if F is non-
manipulable on Y .
In other words, for any subset Y of the agenda X (including the case Y =
X), strategy-proofness of an aggregation rule for closeness-respecting preferences
on Y is equivalent to non-manipulability on the propositions in Y . In particu-
lar, strategy-proofness for closeness-respecting preferences simpliciter is equivalent
to non-manipulability simpliciter. This also implies that, for unrestricted or top-
respecting preferences, strategy-proofness is more demanding than our default con-
dition of non-manipulability, whereas, for closeness-respecting preferences on some
Y ( X, it is less demanding.
Given the equivalence result of Theorem 4, we can now state corollaries of The-
orems 1 and 2 above for strategy-proofness:30
Corollary 1 For each Y ￿ X, if F satis￿es universal domain, the following condi-
tions are equivalent:
(i) F is strategy-proof for CY ;
(ii) F is independent on Y and monotonic on Y ;
(iii) F is independent on Y and weakly monotonic on Y .
Without a domain assumption (e.g., for a subdomain of the universal domain),
(ii) and (iii) are equivalent, and each implies (i).
Corollary 2 For a path-connected agenda X (e.g., a conjunctive, disjunctive or pref-
erence agenda), an aggregation rule F satis￿es universal domain, collective rational-
ity, responsiveness and strategy-proofness for CX if and only if F is a dictatorship of
some individual.
Corollary 2 is a judgment aggregation analogue of Nehring and Puppe￿ s (2002)
characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions in the model of ￿property
spaces￿ .31 The negative part of corollary 2 (i.e., if an aggregation rule satis￿es the
30Our remarks on Theorems 1 and 2 above also apply to Corollaries 1 and 2.
31For compact logics, it follows from their result via Corollary 1. As noted, a disanalogy lies in
the aggregation rule￿ s di⁄erent informational input. In Barber￿ et al. (1993, 1997) and Nehring and
Puppe (2002), each individual submits a preference relation, here a single judgment set. Under some
conditions, judgment sets can be associated with peaks of preference relations.
20conditions, then it is a dictatorship) holds not only for closeness-respecting preferences
(CX) but for any preference speci￿cation C at least as broad as CX, i.e., CX ￿ C, as
strategy-proofness for C then implies strategy-proofness for CX. The positive part of
corollary 2 (i.e., if an aggregation rule is a dictatorship, then it satis￿es the conditions)
holds for any preference speci￿cation C allowing only top-respecting preferences, i.e.,
for any C such that, if %2 C(Ai), then Ai % B for all judgment sets B; otherwise a
dictatorship, although non-manipulable, is not strategy-proof (to see this point, recall
the example of the oil company in Section 4.1).
In summary, if the individuals￿preferences over judgment sets are unrestricted,
top-respecting or closeness-respecting, we obtain a negative result. Moreover, in
analogy with Theorem 3 above, for atomically closed or atomic agendas, we get an
impossibility result even if we weaken responsiveness to the requirement of a non-
constant aggregation rule.
5 Outcome- and reason-oriented preferences
As we have introduced families of strategy-proofness and non-manipulability condi-
tions, it is interesting to consider some less demanding conditions within these fam-
ilies. If we demand strategy-proofness for C = CX, equivalent to non-manipulability
simpliciter, this precludes all incentives for manipulation, where individuals have
closeness-respecting preferences. But individual preferences may sometimes fall into
a more restricted set: they may be closeness-respecting on some subset Y ( X, in
which case it is su¢ cient to require strategy-proofness for CY . As an illustration, we
now apply these ideas to the case of a conjunctive (analogously disjunctive) agenda.
5.1 De￿nitions
Let X be a conjunctive (or disjunctive) agenda. Two important cases of closeness-
respecting preferences on Y are the following.
Outcome-oriented preferences. C = CYoutcome, where Youtcome = fcg+neg.
Reason-oriented preferences. C = CYreason, where Yreason = fa1;:::;akg+neg.
An individual with outcome-oriented preferences cares only about achieving a col-
lective judgment on the conclusion that matches her own judgment, regardless of the
premises. Such preferences make sense if only the conclusion but not the premises have
consequences the individual cares about. An individual with reason-oriented prefer-
ences cares only about achieving collective judgments on the premises that match
21her own judgments, regardless of the conclusion. Such preferences make sense if the
individual gives primary importance to the reasons given in support of outcomes,
rather than the outcomes themselves, or if the group￿ s judgments on the premises
have important consequences themselves that the individual cares about (such as
setting precedents for future decisions). Proponents of a deliberative conception of
democracy often argue that the motivational assumption of reason-oriented prefer-
ences is appropriate in deliberative settings (for a discussion, see Elster 1986; Goodin
1986). Economists, by contrast, assume that in many settings outcome-oriented pref-
erences are the more accurate motivational assumption. Ultimately, it is an empirical
question what preferences are triggered by various settings.
To illustrate, consider premise-based voting and the pro￿le in Table 1. Individual
3￿ s judgment set is A3 = f:a;b;:c;rg, where r = c $ (a ^ b). If all individuals are
truthful, the collective judgment set is A = fa;b;c;rg. If individual 3 untruthfully
submits A￿
3 = f:a;:b;:c;rg and individuals 1 and 2 are truthful, the collective
judgment set is A￿ = fa;:b;:c;rg. Now A￿ is closer to A3 than A on Youtcome =
fcg+neg, whereas A is closer to A3 than A￿ on Yreason = fa;bg+neg: So, under outcome-
oriented preferences, individual 3 (at least weakly) prefers A￿ to A, whereas, under
reason-oriented preferences, individual 3 (at least weakly) prefers A to A￿.
5.2 The strategy-proofness of premise-based voting for
reason-oriented preferences
As shown above, conclusion-based voting is strategy-proof for CX and hence also for
CYreason and CYoutcome. Premise-based voting is not strategy-proof for CX and neither
for CYoutcome, as can easily be seen from our ￿rst example of manipulation. But the
following holds.
Proposition 1 For a conjunctive or disjunctive agenda X, premise-based voting is
strategy-proof for CYreason.
This result is interesting from a deliberative democracy perspective. If individu-
als have reason-oriented preferences in deliberative settings, as sometimes argued
by proponents of a deliberative conception of democracy, then premise-based voting
is strategy-proof in such settings. But if individuals have outcome-oriented prefer-
ences, then the aggregation rule advocated by deliberative democrats is vulnerable to
strategic manipulation, posing a challenge to the deliberative democrats￿view that
truthfulness can easily be achieved under their preferred aggregation rule.
225.3 The strategic equivalence of premise- and conclusion-based vot-
ing for outcome-oriented preferences
Surprisingly, if individuals have outcome-oriented preferences, then premise- and
conclusion-based voting are strategically equivalent in the following sense. For any
pro￿le, there exists, for each of the two rules, a (weakly) dominant-strategy equilib-
rium leading to the same collective judgment on the conclusion. To state this result
formally, some de￿nitions are needed.
Under an aggregation rule F, for individual i with preference ordering %i, submit-
ting the judgment set Bi (which may or may not coincide with individual i￿ s true judg-
ment set Ai) is a weakly dominant strategy if, for every pro￿le (B1;:::;Bi;:::;Bn)
2 Domain(F), F(B1;:::;Bi;:::;Bn) %i F(B1;:::;B￿
i ;:::;Bn) for every i-variant
(B1;:::;B￿
i ;:::;Bn) 2 Domain(F).
Two aggregation rules F and G with identical domain are strategically equivalent
on Y ￿ X for C if, for every pro￿le (A1;:::;An) 2 Domain(F) = Domain(G) and
preference relations %12 C(A1), :::, %n2 C(An), there exist pro￿les (B1;:::;Bn),
(C1;:::;Cn) 2 Domain(F) = Domain(G) such that
(i) for each individual i, submitting Bi is a weakly dominant strategy under
rule F and submitting Ci is a weakly dominant strategy under rule G;
(ii) F(B1;:::;Bn) and G(C1;:::;Cn) agree on every proposition p 2 Y .
Theorem 5 For a conjunctive or disjunctive agenda X, premise- and conclusion-
based voting are strategically equivalent on Youtcome = fcg+neg for CYoutcome.
Despite the di⁄erences between premise- and conclusion-based voting, if indi-
viduals have outcome-oriented preferences and act on appropriate weakly dominant
strategies, the two rules generate identical collective judgments on the conclusion.
This is surprising as premise- and conclusion-based voting are regarded in the liter-
ature as two diametrically opposed aggregation rules.
6 Concluding remarks
As judgment aggregation problems arise in many real-world decision-making bod-
ies, it is important to understand which judgment aggregation rules are vulnerable
to manipulation and which not. We have introduced a non-manipulability condi-
tion for judgment aggregation and characterized the class of non-manipulable judg-
ment aggregation rules. Non-manipulability rules out the existence of opportunities
for manipulation by the untruthful expression of individual judgments. We have
23then de￿ned a game-theoretic strategy-proofness condition and shown that, under
some (but not all) motivational assumptions, it is equivalent to non-manipulability,
as de￿ned earlier. For these motivational assumptions, our characterization of non-
manipulable aggregation rules has allowed us to characterize all strategy-proof aggreg-
ation rules. Strategy-proofness rules out the existence of incentives for manipulation.
Crucially, if individuals do not generally want the group to make collective judgments
that match their own individual judgments, the concepts of non-manipulability and
strategy-proofness may come signi￿cantly apart.
We have also proved an impossibility result that is the judgment aggregation ana-
logue of the classical Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem on preference aggregation. For
the class of path-connected agendas, including conjunctive, disjunctive and preference
agendas, all non-manipulable aggregation rules satisfying some mild conditions are
dictatorial. The impossibility result becomes even stronger for agendas with partic-
ularly rich logical connections between propositions.
To avoid this impossibility, we have suggested that permitting incomplete collect-
ive judgments or domain restrictions are the most promising routes. For example,
conclusion-based voting is strategy-proof, but violates completeness. Another way
to avoid the impossibility is to relax non-manipulability or strategy-proofness itself.
Both conditions fall into more general families of conditions of di⁄erent strength. In-
stead of requiring non-manipulability on the entire agenda of propositions, we may
require non-manipulability only on some subset of the agenda. Premise-based vot-
ing, for example, is non-manipulable on the set of premises, but not non-manipulable
simpliciter. Whether such a weaker non-manipulability condition is su¢ cient in prac-
tice depends on how worried we are about possible opportunities for manipulation
on propositions outside the subset of the agenda for which non-manipulability holds.
Likewise, instead of requiring strategy-proofness for a large class of individual pref-
erences over judgment sets, we may require strategy-proofness only for a restricted
class of preferences, for example for ￿outcome-￿ or ￿reason-oriented￿ preferences.
Premise-based voting, for example, is strategy-proof for ￿reason-oriented￿ prefer-
ences. Whether such a weaker strategy-proofness condition is su¢ cient in practice
depends on the motivations of the decision-makers.
Finally, we have shown that, for ￿outcome-oriented￿ preferences, premise- and
conclusion-based voting are strategically equivalent. They generate the same collect-
ive judgment on the conclusion if individuals act on appropriate weakly dominant
strategies.
Our results raise questions about a prominent position in the literature, according
24to which premise-based voting is superior to conclusion-based voting from a deliberat-
ive democracy perspective. We have shown that, with respect to non-manipulability
and strategy-proofness, conclusion-based voting outperforms premise-based voting.
This result could be generalized beyond conjunctive and disjunctive agendas.
Until now, comparisons between judgment aggregation and preference aggrega-
tion have focused mainly on Condorcet￿ s paradox and Arrow￿ s theorem. With this
paper, we hope to inspire further research on strategic voting and a game-theoretic
perspective in a judgment aggregation context. An important challenge is the devel-
opment of models of deliberation on interconnected propositions ￿where individuals
not only ￿feed￿their judgments into some aggregation rule, but where they deliberate
about the propositions prior to making collective judgments ￿and the study of the
strategic aspects of such deliberation. We leave this challenge for further work.
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A Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Let Y ￿ X. We prove ￿rst that (ii) and (iii) are equivalent,
then that (ii) implies (i), and then that, given universal domain, (i) implies (ii).
(ii) implies (iii). Trivial as monotonicity on Y implies weak monotonicity on Y .
(iii) implies (ii). Suppose F is independent on Y and weakly monotonic on Y .
To show monotonicity on Y , note that in the requirement de￿ning weak monotonicity
on Y one may, by independence on Y , replace ￿for some such pair￿by ￿for all such
pairs￿ . The modi￿ed requirement is equivalent to monotonicity on Y .
(ii) implies (i). Suppose F is independent on Y and monotonic on Y . To show
non-manipulability on Y , consider any proposition p 2 Y; individual i; and pro￿le
(A1;:::;An) 2 Domain(F); such that F(A1;:::;An) disagrees with Ai on p: Take any i-
variant (A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An) 2 Domain(F). We have to show that F(A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An)
still disagrees with Ai on p. Assume ￿rst that Ai and A￿
i agree on p: Then in both
pro￿les (A1;:::;An) and (A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An) exactly the same individuals accept p:
Hence, by independence on Y , F(A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An) agrees with F (A1;:::;An) on p;
hence disagrees with Ai on p: Now assume A￿
i disagrees with Ai on p; i.e., agrees with
F(A1;:::;An) on p. Then, by monotonicity on Y , F(A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An) agrees with
F(A1;:::;An) on p, i.e., disagrees with Ai on p:
(i) implies (ii). Now assume universal domain, and let F be non-manipulable
on Y . To show monotonicity on Y , consider any proposition p 2 Y; individual i;
and pair of i-variants (A1;:::;An);(A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An) 2 Domain(F) with p = 2 Ai and
p 2 A￿
i: If p 2 F(A1;:::;An), then Ai disagrees on p with F(A1;:::;An); hence also
28with F(A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An) by non-manipulability on Y . So p 2 F(A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An).
To show independence on Y , consider any proposition p 2 Y and pro￿les (A1;:::;An);
(A￿
1;:::;A￿
n) 2 Domain(F) such that, for all individuals i; Ai and A￿
i agree on p:
We have to show that F(A1;:::;An) and F(A￿
1;:::;A￿
n) agree on p: Starting with the
pro￿le (A1;:::;An); we replace ￿rst A1 by A￿
1; then A2 by A￿
2; ..., then An by A￿
n:
By universal domain, each replacement leads to a pro￿le still in Domain(F). We
now show that each replacement preserves the collective judgment about p: Assume
for contradiction that for individual i replacement of Ai by A￿
i changes the collective
judgment about p: Since Ai and A￿
i agree on p but the respective outcomes for Ai
and for A￿
i disagree on p; either Ai or A￿
i (but not both) disagrees with the respective
outcome. This is a contradiction, since it allows individual i to manipulate: in the
￿rst case by submitting A￿
i with genuine judgment set Ai; in the second case by
submitting Ai with genuine judgment set A￿
i. Since no replacement has changed the
collective judgment about p; it follows that F(A1;:::;An) and F(A￿
1;:::;A￿
n) agree on
p; which proves independence on Y . ￿
For any propositions p;q, we write p ￿￿ q to mean that p conditionally entails q.
Proof that conjunctive and disjunctive agendas are path-connected. Let X be the
conjunctive agenda X = fa1;:a1;:::;ak;:ak;c;:c;r;:rg, where k ￿ 1 and r is the
connection rule c $ (a1 ^:::^ak). (The proof for a disjunctive agenda is analogous.)
We have to show that for any p;q 2 X there is a sequence p = p1;p2;:::;pk = q in X
(k ￿ 1) such that p1 ￿￿ p2;p2 ￿￿ p3;:::;pk￿1 ￿￿ pk. To show this, it is su¢ cient to
prove that
p ￿￿ q for any propositions p;q 2 X of di⁄erent types, (1)
where a proposition is of type 1 if it is a possibly negated premise (a1;:a1;:::;ak;
:ak), of type 2 if it is the possibly negated conclusion (c;:c) and of type 3 if it is the
possibly negated connection rule (r;:r). The reason is (in short) that, if (1) holds,
then, for any p;q 2 X of the same type, taking any s 2 X of a di⁄erent type, there
is by (1) a path connecting p to s and a path connecting s to q; the concatenation of
both paths connects p to q, as desired. As p ￿￿ q if and only if :q ￿￿ :p (use both
times the same Y ), claim (1) is equivalent to
p ￿￿ q for any propositions p;q 2 X such that p has smaller type than q. (2)
We show (2) by going through the di⁄erent cases (where j 2 f1;:::;kg):
From type 2 to type 3: we have c ￿￿ r and :c ￿￿ :r (take Y = fa1;:::;akg both
times), and c ￿￿ :r and :c ￿￿ r (take Y = f:a1g both times).
29From type 1 to type 2: we have aj ￿￿ c and :aj ￿￿ :c (take Y = fr;a1;:::;aj￿1;
aj+1;:::;akg both times), and aj ￿￿ :c and :aj ￿￿ c (take Y = f:r;a1;:::;aj￿1;aj+1;
:::;akg both times);
From type 1 to type 3: we have aj ￿￿ r and :aj ￿￿ :r (take Y = fc;a1;:::;aj￿1;
aj+1;:::;akg both times), and aj ￿￿ :r and :aj ￿￿ r (take Y = f:c;a1;:::;aj￿1;aj+1;
:::;akg both times). ￿
Proof of Theorem 2. Let X be path-connected. If F is dictatorial, it obviously sat-
is￿es universal domain, collective rationality, responsiveness and non-manipulability.
Now suppose F has all these properties, hence is also independent and monotonic by
Theorem 1. We show that F is dictatorial. If X contains no contingent proposition,
F is trivially dictatorial (where each individual is a dictator). From now on, suppose
X is not of this degenerate type. For any consistent set Z ￿ X; let AZ be some
consistent and complete judgment set such that Z ￿ AZ (which exists by L1-L3).
Claim 1. F satis￿es the unanimity principle: for any p 2 X and any (A1;:::;An) 2
Domain(F), if p 2 Ai for each i then p 2 F(A1;:::;An).
Consider any p 2 X and (A1;:::;An) 2 Domain(F) such that p 2 Ai for every
i. Since the sets Ai are consistent, p is consistent. If :p is inconsistent (i.e., p is a
tautology), p 2 F(A1;:::;An) by collective rationality. Now suppose :p is consistent.
As each of p;:p is consistent, p is contingent. So, by responsiveness, there exists a
pro￿le (B1;:::;Bn) 2 Domain(F) such that p 2 F(B1;:::;Bn). In (B1;:::;Bn) we now
replace one by one each judgment set Bi by Ai, until we obtain the pro￿le (A1;:::;An).
Each replacement preserves the collective acceptance of p, either by monotonicity (if
p = 2 Bi) or by independence (if p 2 Bi). So p 2 F(A1;:::;An), as desired.
Claim 2. F is systematic: there exists a set W of (￿winning￿ ) coalitions C ￿ N
such that, for every (A1;:::;An) 2 Domain(F), F(A1;:::;An) = fp 2 X : fi : p 2
Aig 2 Wg.
For each contingent p 2 X, let Wp be the set all subsets C ￿ N such that
p 2 F(A1;:::;An) for some (hence by independence any) (A1;:::;An) 2 Domain(F)
with fi : p 2 Aig = C. Consider any contingent p;q 2 X. We prove that Wp = Wq.
Suppose C 2 Wp, and let us show that C 2 Wq; this proves the inclusion Wq ￿ Wp,
and the converse inclusion can be shown analogously. As X is path-connected, there
are p = p1;p2;:::;pk = q 2 X with p1 ￿￿ p2, p2 ￿￿ p3, ..., pk￿1 ￿￿ pk. We show by
induction that C 2 Wpj for all j = 1;2;:::;k. If j = 1 then C 2 Cp1 by p1 = p. Now
let 1 ￿ j < k and assume C 2 Wpj. By pj ￿￿ pj+1, there is a set Y ￿ X such that
fpjg [ Y and f:pj+1g [ Y are each consistent but fpj;pj+1g [ Y is inconsistent. It
follows that each of fpj;pj+1g [ Y and f:pj;:pj+1g [ Y is consistent (using L3 in
30conjunction with L1,L2). So we may de￿ne a pro￿le (A1;:::;An) 2 Domain(F) by
Ai :=
(
Afpj;pj+1g[Y if i 2 C
Af:pj;:pj+1g[Y if i 2 NnC.
Since Y ￿ Ai for all i, Y ￿ F(A1;:::;An) by claim 1. Since fi : pj 2 Aig = C 2 Wpj,
we have pj 2 F(A1;:::;An). So fpjg[Y ￿ F(A1;:::;An). Hence, since fpj;:pj+1g[Y
is inconsistent, :pj+1 = 2 F(A1;:::;An), whence pj+1 2 F(A1;:::;An). So, as fi : pj+1 2
Aig = C, we have C 2 Wpj+1, as desired.
As Wp is the same set for each contingent p 2 X, let W be this set. To complete
the proof of the claim, it is su¢ cient to show that, for every (A1;:::;An) 2 Domain(F)
and every p 2 X, p 2 F(A1;:::;An) if and only if fi : p 2 Aig 2 W. If p is contingent
this holds by de￿nition of W; if p is a tautology it holds because p 2 F(A1;:::;An)
(by collective rationality), fi : p 2 Aig = N (by universal domain) and N 2 W
(by claim 1); analogously, if p is a contradiction it holds because p = 2 F(A1;:::;An),
fi : p 2 Aig = ; and ; = 2 W.
Claim 3. (1) N 2 W; (2) for every coalition C ￿ N, C 2 W if and only if
NnC = 2 W; (3) for every coalitions C;C￿ ￿ N, if C 2 W and C ￿ C￿ then C￿ 2 W.
Part (1) follows from claim 1. Regarding parts (2) and (3), note that, for any C ￿
N, there exists a p 2 X and an (A1;:::;An) 2 Domain(F) with fi : p 2 Aig = C; this
holds because X contains a contingent proposition p. Part (2) holds because, for any
(A1;:::;An) 2 Domain(F), each of the sets A1;:::;An;F(A1;:::;An) contains exactly
one member of any pair p;:p 2 X, by universal domain and collective rationality.
Part (3) follows from a repeated application of monotonicity and universal domain.
Claim 4. There exists an inconsistent set Y ￿ X with pairwise disjoint subsets
Z1;Z2;Z3 such that (Y nZj)[Z:
j is consistent for any j 2 f1;2;3g. Here, Z: := f:p :
p 2 Zg for any Z ￿ X.
By assumption, there exists a contingent p 2 X; also :p is then contingent. So, by





for each t 2 f1;:::;k ￿ 1g, fpt;:pt+1g [ Y ￿
t is inconsistent; and (3)
for each t 2 f1;:::;k ￿ 1g, fptg [ Y ￿
t and f:pt+1g [ Y ￿
t are consistent. (4)
From (3) and (4) it follows (using L3 in conjunction with L1, L2) that
for each t 2 f1;:::;k ￿ 1g, fpt;pt+1g [ Y ￿
t and f:pt;:pt+1g [ Y ￿
t are consistent. (5)
We ￿rst show that there exists a t 2 f1;:::;k￿1g such that fpt;:pt+1g is consist-
ent. Assume for contradiction that each of fp1;:p2g;:::;fpk￿1;:pkg is inconsistent.
31So (using L2) each of fp1;:p2g;fp1;p2;:p3g;:::;fp1;:::;pk￿1;:pkg is inconsistent. As
fp1g = fpg is consistent, either fp1;p2g or fp1;:p2g is consistent (by L2 and L3);
hence, as fp1;:p2g is inconsistent, fp1;p2g is consistent. So either fp1;p2;p3g or
fp1;p2;:p3g is consistent (again by L2 and L3); hence, as fp1;p2;:p3g is inconsist-
ent, fp1;p2;p3g is consistent. Continuing this argument, it follows after k ￿ 1 steps
that fp1;:::;pkg is consistent. Hence fp1;pkg is consistent (by L2), i.e., fp;:pg is
consistent, a contradiction (by L1).
We have shown that there is a t 2 f1;:::;k￿1g such that fpt;:pt+1g is consistent,
whence Y ￿
t 6= ; by (3). De￿ne Y := fpt;:pt+1g[Y ￿
t , Z1 := fptg; and Z2 := f:pt+1g.
Since fpt;:pt+1g is consistent, fpt;:pt+1g [ B is consistent for some set B that
contains q or :q (but not both) for each q 2 Y ￿
t (by L3 together with L1,L2). Note
that there exists a Z3 ￿ Y ￿
t with B = (Y ￿
t nZ3) [ Z:
3 . This proves the claim, since:
- Y = fpt;:pt+1g [ Y ￿
t is inconsistent by (3),
- Z1;Z2;Z3 are pairwise disjoint subsets of Y ,
- (Y nZ1) [ Z:
1 = (Y nfptg) [ f:ptg = f:pt;:pt+1g [ Y ￿
t is consistent by (4),
- (Y nZ2) [ Z:
2 = (Y nf:pt+1g) [ fpt+1g = fpt;pt+1g [ Y ￿
t is consistent by (4),
- (Y nZ3) [ Z:
3 = fpt;:pt+1g [ (Y ￿
t nZ3) [ Z:
3 = fpt;:pt+1g [ B is consistent.
Claim 5. For any coalitions C;C￿ ￿ N; if C;C￿ 2 W then C \ C￿ 2 W.
Consider any C;C￿ 2 W, and assume for contradiction that C1 := C \ C￿ = 2 W.
Put C2 := C￿nC and C3 := NnC￿. Let Y;Z1;Z2;Z3 be as in claim 4. Noting that






1 if i 2 C1
A(Y nZ2)[Z:
2 if i 2 C2
A(Y nZ3)[Z:
3 if i 2 C3.
By C1 = 2 W and NnC1 = C2 [ C3 we have C2 [ C3 2 W by claim 3, and so Z1 ￿
F(A1;:::;An). By C 2 W and C ￿ C1 [ C3 we have C1 [ C3 2 W by claim 3, and
so Z2 ￿ F(A1;:::;An). Further, Z3 ￿ F(A1;:::;An) as C1 [ C2 = C￿ 2 W. Finally,
Y n(Z1 [ Z2 [ Z3) ￿ F(A1;:::;An) as N 2 W by claim 3. In summary, we have
Y ￿ F(A1;:::;An), violating consistency.
Claim 6. There is a dictator.
Consider the intersection of all winning coalitions, e C := \C2WC: By claim 5,
e C 2 W. So e C 6= ;, as by claim 3, ; = 2 W. Hence there is a j 2 e C: To show
that j is a dictator, consider any (A1;:::;An) 2 Domain(F) and p 2 X, and let
us prove that p 2 F(A1;:::;An) if and only if p 2 Aj. If p 2 F(A1;:::;An) then
C := fi : p 2 Aig 2 W, whence j 2 C (as j belongs to every winning coalition), i.e.,
32p 2 Aj. Conversely, if p = 2 F(A1;:::;An); then :p 2 F(A1;:::;An); so by an argument
analogous to the previous one, :p 2 Aj, whence p = 2 Aj. ￿
Proof of Theorem 4. Let Y ￿ X.
(i) First, assume F is strategy-proof for CY : To show non-manipulability on Y ,
consider any proposition p 2 Y; individual i; and pro￿le (A1;:::;An) 2 Domain(F);
such that F(A1;:::;An) disagrees with Ai on p: Let (A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An) 2 Domain(F)
be any i-variant. We have to show that F(A1;:::; A￿
i;:::; An) still disagrees with Ai
on p: De￿ne a preference relation %i over judgment sets by [B %i B￿ if and only if
Ai agrees on p with B but not with B￿; or with both B and B￿; or with neither
B nor B￿]. (%i is interpreted as individual i￿ s preference relation in case i cares
only about p.) It follows immediately that %i is re￿ exive and transitive and respects
closeness to Ai on Y , i.e., is a member of CY (Ai). So, by strategy-proofness for CY ;
F(A1;:::;An) %i F(A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An): Since Ai disagrees with F(A1;:::;An) on p; the
de￿nition of %i implies that Ai still disagrees with F(A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An) on p:
(ii) Now assume that F is non-manipulable on Y . To show strategy-proofness
for CY , consider any individual i; pro￿le (A1;:::;An) 2 Domain(F); and preference
relation %i2 CY (Ai); and let (A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An) 2 Domain(F) be any i-variant. We
have to prove that F(A1;:::;An) %i F(A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An). By non-manipulability on
Y , for every proposition p 2 Y; if Ai disagrees with F(A1;:::;An) on p; then also
with F(A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An); in other words, if Ai agrees with F(A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An) on
p; then also with F(A1;:::;An): So F(A1;:::;An) is at least as close to Ai on Y as
F(A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An): Hence F(A1;:::;An) %i F(A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An); as %i2 CY (Ai). ￿
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove this result directly, although it can also be
derived from Corollary 1. Let F be premise-based voting. To show that F is strategy-
proof for CYreason, consider any individual i; pro￿le (A1;:::;An) 2 Domain(F); i-
variant (A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An) 2 Domain(F); and preference relation %i2 CYreason(Ai):
The de￿nition of premise-based voting implies that F(A1;:::;An) is at least as close
to Ai as F(A1; :::; A￿
i; :::; An) on Yreason. So, by %i2 CYreason(Ai), we have
F(A1;:::;An) %i F(A1;:::;A￿
i;:::;An). ￿
Proof of Theorem 5. Consider the conjunctive agenda (the proof is analogous
for disjunctive agendas). Let F and G be premise- and conclusion-based voting,
respectively. Take any pro￿le (A1;:::;An) 2 Domain(F) = Domain(G) and any




f:a1;:::;:ak;c $ (a1 ^ ::: ^ ak);:cg if :c 2 Ai,
fa1;:::;ak;c $ (a1 ^ ::: ^ ak);cg if c 2 Ai.
It can easily be seen that, for each i and any pair of i-variants (D1;:::;Bi;:::;Dn);
(D1;:::;B￿
i ;:::;Dn) 2 Domain(F), F(D1;:::;Bi;:::;Dn) is at least as close to
Ai on Youtcome (= fc;:cg) as F(D1;:::;B￿
i ;:::;Dn); so (D1;:::;Bi;:::;Dn) %i
(D1;:::;B￿
i ;:::;Dn) as %i2 CYoutcome(Ai). Hence, submitting Bi is a weakly domin-
ant strategy for each i under F. Second, let (C1;:::;Cn) be (A1;:::;An) (the truth-
ful pro￿le). Then, for each i, submitting Ci is a weakly dominant strategy under
G, as G is strategy-proof. Finally, it can easily be seen that F(B1;:::;Bn) and
G(C1;:::;Cn) = G(A1;:::;An) agree on each proposition in Youtcome = fc;:cg. ￿
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